THUCYDIDES, II
THUCYDIDES, II
c. 460 - c. 400 B.C.
Diotorus spoke at the assembly where the Athenaian's were re=considering their decree to kill all the men of Mytilene. He urged them to stay the executions. Cleon spoke first, and urged against it, at the same time attacking the habit of re-considerations which he said merely allowed speaker's to display their vanity. (III 38.2 -3, 27.3 -4). Diototus thus began by defending the propriety of the practice of re=deliberation about the city's affairs, which he called "the greatest things." He warns that the city is harmed when speakers accuse one another (for instance, of being corrupted by moneY) because then fear deprives them of councelors. Speakers who make such accusations should not be permitted to speak. In a 'moderate city', no unsuccessful speakers should be dishonored or feel so. The Athenians, he says boldly, are so envious that they would reject what is manfestly the best advice for the city if they surspected the speaker of giving this good advice for the sake of gain. He claims that even a speaker who wants to say what is better must lie to the multitude in order to be trusted, and that it is impossible to benefit the city without deceiving it. (III 42-43). With remarkable frankness, he tell the Athenians that he will therefore deceive them.
His first lie appears to be the claim he will not even consider the question of justice. True, he argues that holding out the prospect of leniency will make the multitude more likely to hand over rebels in future. But he also argues it is impossible to deter rebellions, since men by nature, both privately and publicly, commit transgressions, and that no law or threat of punishment will restrain them from this. In other words, we are compelled, by our passions and hopes, to try to acquire the objects of our strongest desires. (III 45). And since we are compelled to do this, however foolish our hopes for success may be, our mistakes are involuntary; and even Cleon had admitted that involuntary crimes deserve pardon. By speaking of the compulsoriness of transgression, he puts the Athenians in a forgiving mood, and he reawakens the mild temper with which they had begun the day's assembly. In this way, he makes them receptive to his contention that to kill the multitude of the Mytileneans would be unjust.
A too open argument against the justice of these killings would have pained them, and it would have made them suspect some weakness in the argument. Since the city is so excessively distrustful of those citizens who address it, Diotorus must try to win its trust by appearing unconcerned with justice, at least to the extent that is a notion distinct from the city's interests. He thus says several times that the city's interests, especially its rule over others, are the 'greatest things', and succeeds in making himself trusted - based upon deception.
Diotorus has given the impression that his hidden concern is primarily one for justice. But this is not so. Diotorus has said that all men are of such a nature to transgress law. Since he knows this, law or justice cannot be his chief concern. Moreover, he explicitly applies the Athenian argument about justice (see part I) to individuals, something that no other speaker in Thucydides ever does. In other words, he is the only speaker who clearly indicates that the primacy of the good is in fact the primacy of the individual's good, as distinct from that of the city. The Athenian suspicions, then, that their speakers are moved chiefly by private self-interest turn out to be well-grounded, at least in the case of Diotorus. It is true that Diodotus' private interest as an Athenian, and even his educated humanity, both prompt him to try to be useful to Athens by persuading it to rescind a harsh and ill-advised decree, But the Athenians would not have listened to him if they had understood his motives.
We know little more about this politically gifted man. This fact indicates that he did not regard rule over others, or its fruits, as the ultimate good for the individual, although he says little more about the characher of this good. But does not Thucydides, by his example, secretly direct us towards his own way of life - above all, his "quest for truth" and his writing of a "possession for all time"? (I 20.3, 22.4). For men, or at least the most capable men, are compelled by the very seriousness of their moral and political concerns to the question of truth of their most cherished convictions, and ultimately to turn to philosophy as their supreme good. It was Thucydides who had the strength of mind to accept this compulsion and to think it through until he understood it clearly. And from this understanding he gained still further strength. For only from the perspective that he thus attained could he continue to look at political life, including its great horrors as well as its beauties, with such calm clarity, while also acting upon it, through his writing, with such balance and humanity.
*The foregoing essay is a heavily abbreviated version of the essay by David Bolotin published in 'The History Of Political Philosophy', edited and compiled by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey. I make no claims to originality over the content, but I hope this condensed version may perhaps prove useful to people who don't have time to read the original.
c. 460 - c. 400 B.C.
Diotorus spoke at the assembly where the Athenaian's were re=considering their decree to kill all the men of Mytilene. He urged them to stay the executions. Cleon spoke first, and urged against it, at the same time attacking the habit of re-considerations which he said merely allowed speaker's to display their vanity. (III 38.2 -3, 27.3 -4). Diototus thus began by defending the propriety of the practice of re=deliberation about the city's affairs, which he called "the greatest things." He warns that the city is harmed when speakers accuse one another (for instance, of being corrupted by moneY) because then fear deprives them of councelors. Speakers who make such accusations should not be permitted to speak. In a 'moderate city', no unsuccessful speakers should be dishonored or feel so. The Athenians, he says boldly, are so envious that they would reject what is manfestly the best advice for the city if they surspected the speaker of giving this good advice for the sake of gain. He claims that even a speaker who wants to say what is better must lie to the multitude in order to be trusted, and that it is impossible to benefit the city without deceiving it. (III 42-43). With remarkable frankness, he tell the Athenians that he will therefore deceive them.
His first lie appears to be the claim he will not even consider the question of justice. True, he argues that holding out the prospect of leniency will make the multitude more likely to hand over rebels in future. But he also argues it is impossible to deter rebellions, since men by nature, both privately and publicly, commit transgressions, and that no law or threat of punishment will restrain them from this. In other words, we are compelled, by our passions and hopes, to try to acquire the objects of our strongest desires. (III 45). And since we are compelled to do this, however foolish our hopes for success may be, our mistakes are involuntary; and even Cleon had admitted that involuntary crimes deserve pardon. By speaking of the compulsoriness of transgression, he puts the Athenians in a forgiving mood, and he reawakens the mild temper with which they had begun the day's assembly. In this way, he makes them receptive to his contention that to kill the multitude of the Mytileneans would be unjust.
A too open argument against the justice of these killings would have pained them, and it would have made them suspect some weakness in the argument. Since the city is so excessively distrustful of those citizens who address it, Diotorus must try to win its trust by appearing unconcerned with justice, at least to the extent that is a notion distinct from the city's interests. He thus says several times that the city's interests, especially its rule over others, are the 'greatest things', and succeeds in making himself trusted - based upon deception.
Diotorus has given the impression that his hidden concern is primarily one for justice. But this is not so. Diotorus has said that all men are of such a nature to transgress law. Since he knows this, law or justice cannot be his chief concern. Moreover, he explicitly applies the Athenian argument about justice (see part I) to individuals, something that no other speaker in Thucydides ever does. In other words, he is the only speaker who clearly indicates that the primacy of the good is in fact the primacy of the individual's good, as distinct from that of the city. The Athenian suspicions, then, that their speakers are moved chiefly by private self-interest turn out to be well-grounded, at least in the case of Diotorus. It is true that Diodotus' private interest as an Athenian, and even his educated humanity, both prompt him to try to be useful to Athens by persuading it to rescind a harsh and ill-advised decree, But the Athenians would not have listened to him if they had understood his motives.
We know little more about this politically gifted man. This fact indicates that he did not regard rule over others, or its fruits, as the ultimate good for the individual, although he says little more about the characher of this good. But does not Thucydides, by his example, secretly direct us towards his own way of life - above all, his "quest for truth" and his writing of a "possession for all time"? (I 20.3, 22.4). For men, or at least the most capable men, are compelled by the very seriousness of their moral and political concerns to the question of truth of their most cherished convictions, and ultimately to turn to philosophy as their supreme good. It was Thucydides who had the strength of mind to accept this compulsion and to think it through until he understood it clearly. And from this understanding he gained still further strength. For only from the perspective that he thus attained could he continue to look at political life, including its great horrors as well as its beauties, with such calm clarity, while also acting upon it, through his writing, with such balance and humanity.
*The foregoing essay is a heavily abbreviated version of the essay by David Bolotin published in 'The History Of Political Philosophy', edited and compiled by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey. I make no claims to originality over the content, but I hope this condensed version may perhaps prove useful to people who don't have time to read the original.
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